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1. On the study of contemporary conservatism in Southern Europe: 
Preliminary remarks and some definitional ambiguities
With the exception of Portugal, a paradox of the Southern European 
democracies is that they were founded and made workable by ambiguous 
democrats. In Italy and Greece, it was the lineal descendants of pre-fascist 
conservatism who came back to power, while, in Spain, former francoist 
functionaries simply retained theirs. Everywhere, those "new" conservatives 
found themselves burdened with spoiled political legacies and tainted images. 
Nonetheless, they all tried to recast their old beliefs in democratic molds and 
finally succeeded in consolidating the nascent democratic regimes in their 
respective country by following remarkably similar tactics. So obvious that is 
often overlooked, the fact is that democratic consolidation in Italy, Greece and 
Spain occurred under conservative rule and, to a large extent, is the outcome 
of specific conservative-government tactics. I shall, then, take Morlino's 
advise quite literally: "If consolidation is conceived as a process [...], not merely 
as the result of a process, the main protagonists of that process [...] must be 
placed at the center of our analysis." 1 The main aim of this study is to explore 
the strategies pursued and the political programs applied by those 
conservatives in Southern Europe who, taking power, aimed to solidify 
recently established democracies.
Rossiter has put it splendidly: "'Conservatism' is a word whose usefulness is 
matched only by its capacity to confuse, distort, and irritate."2 The first task 
then involves the definition of our referents of the concept "conservative". 
Whom should we include and whom to leave out? My intention is to 
consider those conservative parties that meet the following criteria. First, the
1 Leonardo Morlino, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe", 
in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Jans-Jurgen Puhle (eds.). The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 315.
Clinton Rossiter, “Conservatism”, in David L. Shills (ed.), International Encyclopedia 





























































































anti-Left criterion, which sets the leftward boundary of the genus 
"conservative". Second, the pro-democracy criterion, which discriminates 
against the far-right extreme, thus delimiting the scope of analysis by moving 
from the genus to the species level. These two criteria help us define our 
conservative universe against extreme Right^ and Left,4 and adequately 
answer the question: Conservative politics with respect to what? A third 
criterion, the relative political significance criterion, discriminates against 
politically feeble, albeit sometimes important, formations—that host of small 
centrist or center-to-the-right parties^ that, squeezed as they also were between 
radical Left and undemocratic Right, remained firmly committed to 
democratic, yet essentially conservative, politics. Two yardsticks become thus 
readily available for including certain conservative forces in this analysis 
while excluding others: incumbency (when they are in office) and/or size 
(when in opposition).
The main objects of analysis should have become clear by now. In Italy, the 
dominant expression of democratic conservatism was until recently the 
Democrazia Cristiana (DC), a party that initially emerged as a denominational, 
interclass formation. Contrary to widespread arguments about the negative 
relationship between Catholicism and democracy,6 the DC was able to apply its 
democratic program in Italy and remain in office for almost half a century. In 
Greece, Nea Democratia (ND), a party drawing its political lineage from the
In the extreme Right most prominently belong the neotascist Movimento Sociale Italiano 
(MSI); in Greece, the pro-juntist Ethniki Parataxis (EP); and, in Spain, the Fuerza Nuova and, at 
least until 1979, the Alianza Popular (AP).
4 With the partial exception of Italy, the crucial distinction in this respect is not between 
moderate conservatism and the communist left but between the former and its more immediate 
socialists, that is, the PASOK in Greece and the PSOE in Spain. In Italy, the socialist PSI 
coalesced with the Christian Democrats, thus, on the Left, it was the communists that remained 
the most visible opponents of conservative politics.
5 1 am here referring mainly to the once-potent Union of the Democratic Center, EDIK, in 
Greece; the Centro Democratico Social, CDS, in Spain; or the politically significant Liberals, 
Republicans, and Social Democrats in Italy.
6 See, for instance, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 




























































































interwar People's Party and political support from all quarters in society, 
became the fourth consecutive formation of political conservatism in the 
country. This party managed the 1974 transition to democracy almost single- 
handedly and, subsequently, handled the developments that led to democratic 
consolidation. After electoral defeat in 1981, the ND not only managed to 
survive, but also remained a strong party fit to govern. In Spain, democratic 
conservatism was represented by a party with the misleading title Union de 
Centro Democratico (UCD). In reality, the UCD was an offshot of moderate 
Francoism, led by former Francoist functionaries, yet able to occupy the center 
in Spanish politics. Like the ND, it played a crucial role during the long phase 
of transition to democracy in Spain, and remained the incumbent party until 
1982. Unlike the ND, however, it gradually disintegrated and, when it lost 
office, was eclipsed by another conservative party, Alianza Popular (AP). The 
latter (to be renamed the Partido Popular, PP, in 1989) moved into the vacuum 
left by the UCD, and made the necessary ideological adjustments to appeal to 
the moderate voters. Thus, coming to border the socialist PSOE in terms of 
political competition, the PP became an important and sizeable party with a 
valid claim to power. By that time, however, political conservatism had 
developed a wholly different content from that of the early post-authoritarian 
period.
2. Political conservatism in the era of limited democracy
The origins of modern conservatism in Southern Europe (Portugal inclusive) 
lay in the earlier decades of this century and are coincident with the tortuous 
passage from pre-capitalist to more capitalist economies and from oligarchic 
politics to more democratic ones7 This is less to say, of course, that prior to
7 Edward Malefakis, "The Political and Socioeconomic Contours of Southern European 



























































































that time there was no conservatism, than that there was little else besides it. 
For many slow decades in the nineteenth century financial and agrarian 
oligarchs had managed to dominate southern European politics and, by 
trading favors and the spoils associated with office, regularly alternate in 
power. The aim was to safeguard the interests of what were vaguely termed 
the "conservative classes" (that is to say, the property-owning oligarchy) and 
defend them against the apprehended tide of revolution. Other political forces 
were kept small, usually by limitations on electoral suffrage, and effectively 
outside the political system. Yet, those political newcomers won considerable 
moral credits in society, which they would subsequently turn into their most 
valuable asset in the forthcoming battles against political conservatism.
This anti-popular and exclusive political arrangement became impossible 
around the turn of the century, just when the European South was trying to 
accomplish its passage to capitalism. Growing industrialization and the 
beginning of a trend to the cities helped the emergence of new social forces 
and the development of assertive labor movements. Change was everywhere 
under way. In Italy and Spain, in particular, new urban proletariats and old 
rural paupers turned radical to the point of threatening the stability of the 
former political consensus. Greece lagged behind similar developments, this 
due partly to the country's small size and partly to her late industrialization. In 
all three countries, as new social groups started making their presence felt and 
increasingly overloaded the old political system with new pressures and 
demands, it became evident that the time-honored oligarchic design was no 
longer viable.
At a time when the name conservatism still did not have the loathsome 
connotations it would later take on, the hegemonic conservatives in Southern
5
version, see Malefakis, Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview, 




























































































Europe found it necessary to propose an alternative political design. 
Confronted with crisis, their most typical reaction was to advocate 
"revolutions from above". At its core, this political program involved the 
strengthening of governments and, at society's level, a necessary alignment of 
national bourgeoisies with what were vaguely termed the "respectable" 
middle classes® or, with no more conceptual clarity, the "conservative 
classes".9
That political venture turned sour. In Spain, the task of "regenerating" 
conservatism was undertaken first by Francisco Silvela at the turn of the 
century, and then, even more decisively, by his successors Antonio Maura and 
Eduardo Dato.l® The 1909 rising in Barcelona that led to the semana trdgica 
and Dato's assassination in 1921 remain sad testimonies to the failures of 
Spanish reformist conservatism. In Greece, a deep intra-bourgeois conflict 
developed between two camps, one associated with the monarchy, the other 
with republicanism. At the center of this conflict was the struggle of the more 
traditional elements of society associated with an already obese state and its 
functions (suitably described as a "[petty] bourgeoisie d' etat"^ ) against the 
emerging commercial and entrepreneurial sectors of the middle class.^  
Gradually, however, and in the face of increased agitation at society's base, the 
Greek middle classes would unite and also support "a series of repressive 
measures designed to safeguard what came to be described in Greek legal texts *1
° Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe," in 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.). Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, vol.l (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 13.
R. A. H. Robinson, "Political Conservatism: The Spanish Case, 1875-1977", Journal of 
Contemporary History 14:4 (October 1979), 511.
Besides Robinson, ibid., see Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Conservatism, 1834-1923", Journal 
of Contemporary History 13:4 (October 1978), 765-89.
11 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects of Democracy in Greece: 
1974-1983", in O'Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 140.
George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in 
Greece, 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 
Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian Greece, Madrid: Instituto Juan 




























































































as 'the established social order'". 13 Finally, in Italy, moderate conservatives 
(both the liberal Giolittians and the Catholic Popolari) were no better disposed 
to push for reforms. Tightly squeezed between fierce clericalism and 
nationalism from one side and growing radicalism from the other, they 
proved equally unable to cope with the new era of mass politics. The 
introduction of proportional representation and the lowering of voting age 
caused a huge increase of mass parties in Parliament, and political elites 
proved unable to respond democratically to the mobilization of society. They 
chose, instead, "to perform the control function that had been relinquished by 
the institutional structure".* 14
The common difficulty of the foregoing attempts to reform old conservatism 
was their inability (and, sometimes, unwillingness) to pacify, let alone 
incorporate, the emerging masses by means of political initiative, social 
legislation, or ideological moderation. Instead, established political elites 
sought to keep societies excluded from active politics by using the state—either 
positively (e.g., selective distribution of state benefits) or in the negative (e.g., 
selective repression of particular groups or suppression of particular 
demands). Everywhere personalities prevailed rather than political 
institutions, clienteles rather than party organizations, patronage rather than 
generalized social policies. Intensely traditionalist and politically inflexible, the 
established order not only opposed claims for open democracy; when 
necessary it did not hesitate to turn reactionary since its main function was 
defending the status quo instead of accommodating change. When even those 
measures seemed to be failing, the conservatives (with the notable exception
13 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects of Democracy in Greece: 
1974-1983", in O'Donnell et al.. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 142.
14 Paolo Fameti, "Social Conflict, Parliamentary Fragmentation, Institutional Shift, and 
the Rise of Fascism: Italy", in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of 




























































































of Italy) went "knocking at the barracks" for army support.^ Political parties 
failed to acquire institutional autonomy when exclusionary and repressive 
politics depended for legitimacy on the state rather than directly on society. In 
fact, what resembled political parties were no other than loose coalitions of 
notables and office-seekers without coherent political programs. Being by and 
large able to control the classes dangereuses through their own hold on the 
state (or, in emergency cases, by army coups), the conservative forces never 
thought it necessary to constitute themselves in the form of organized, stable, 
and legitimized political parties. In the end, they proved singularly unable to 
attract in their programs the already vocal and increasingly radicalized masses.
Eventually, classic southern European conservatism met its unglorious end 
when it was succeeded by fascist or military dictatorships. Italy came first with 
Mussolini's March on Rome in October 1922. Only a few months later, in 
Spain, the Canovite political system that had lasted for over forty years would 
also be dismanled and replaced by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera. 
Democracy was briefly reinstituted in Spain during the short-lived Second 
Republic (1931-36), but by that time conservatism was very much on the 
defensive vis-à-vis the left, and also lacked clear political purpose. Greece had 
its dictatorial experience in 1936 with the Metaxas regime. Limited democracy 
enjoyed a new, albeit not ordinary, lease of life in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
When a long series of conservative governments led mostly by Karamanlis 
and backed by an anti-communist state was interrupted by the electoral 
victories of the center-left in 1963-64, the country entered a period of protracted 
crisis. As had been the case earlier in the rest of Southern Europe, the 
conservative ultras in Greece mounted a military coup in 1967, putting an end 
to formal democracy and persecuting radical leftists, moderate centrists, and 
moderate conservatives alike. Despite their relative victimization by the *
D  jUan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 




























































































dictators, the latter would not find it easy to establish their democratic 
credentials although, in the meantime, they had become the actual champions 
of democracy.
The authoritarian experience in Southern Europe charged "conservatism" 
with pejorative meaning. For large social segments, conservative politics 
simply became "the Right" and, in everyday parlance, this came to mean 
something derogatory. In reality, however, authoritarianism had managed to 
split the conservatibe universe into two parts, one extremist and reactionary, 
the other moderate and reformist, which would thereafter make strange 
bedfellows. After the collapse of the dictatorships, when Italy, Greece and 
Spain were back on the democratic track, and as the surviving conservatives 
were trying to jettison their reactionary past and establish a new consensus, 
they discovered that they lacked a common and legitimate historical 
experience to which they could make reference. Quite certainly, this was "a 
somewhat paradoxical state of affairs for a political ideology which values 
tradition as an essential symbolic element".^
3. From authoritarian conservatism to conservative democracies: 
Genetic traits and hereditary constraints
Notwithstanding their other dissimilarities, the democratic transitions in 
Italy, Greece and Spain shared two features that are often overlooked, but 
which became of key importance in subsequent political developments. None 
was violently overthrown by mass or other external action; also, it was 
conservative, not radical forces, that assumed power there immediately after 
dictatorial collapse. It bears repetition, in none of our three countries did the 
new conservative leaders come out of a clear political sky. In the immediate 
post-authoritarian environment, no conservative leader was really new. They 16
16 Ramon Garda Cotarelo and Lourdes Lopez Nieto, "Spanish Conservatism, 1976-87" in 




























































































all had a political history and roots in previous regimes (be they crippled 
democracies, as in Italy and Greece, or Spain's dying dictatorship). What was 
new was that, as is the case in all democracies, the cost of repression by that 
time far exceeded the cost of toleration, and the cost of exclusion seemed much 
higher than that of political inclusion. All conservative leaders, therefore, felt 
for the first time obliged to abandon traditional immobilism and exclusionary 
politics, and take the initiative to providing their societies with new 
incorporative political institutions. Uncomfortable as such a situation may 
have been for them, fear of historical obsolescence was, to be sure, stronger 
than the strains of political adaptation. What follows is an explanation of the 
common features of democratic transition in Italy, Greece and Spain (in 
contrast to the Portuguese case), and then a short account of the founding of 
each country's main conservative party. Finally, I shall describe the main 
themes, as well as the objectives of the conservative democratic program in 
the early post-authoritarian years.
The first common characteristic of the democratic transitions in Italy, Greece 
and Spain is that nowhere did an authoritarian regime come down through 
protracted mass unrest or popular revolution.^ Nowhere were previous 
authoritarian regimes overthrown by their "natural" enemies; they simply 
collapsed (or, in the case of Spain, became self-liquidated) under the weight of 
their own faults, deficiencies, or limitations. Italy (1943) and Greece (1974) 
present the simplest cases since there the reactionary social order passed into 
history after defeat in war or military folly respectively. Only in Italy was the 
left in a position to mobilize the masses against the initiatives of the 
conservative Christian Democrats and potentially capable of capturing 
power—a possibility that was to a large extent annulled by Togliatti's initially
*7 It is worth recalling in this respect Huntington's claim that "democratic regimes that last 
have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action"; Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More 



























































































conciliatory strategy. In Spain, Francoism was dismantled piecemeal within a 
period of several months after its founder's death (1975) by the very 
individuals who had been entrusted with its preservation. The transition to 
democracy took place in a climate of relative political moderation where the 
main political actors exchanged reciprocal concessions and made pacts. The 
formerly clandestine Communist Party simply acquiesced to the process.
The second shared feature after the collapse of authoritarian rule in Italy, 
Greece, and Spain was the leadership given by old conservative forces 
(political as well as social; secular as well as clerical) that formed into parties 
and undertook the task of reinstituting democracies and making them work. 
The phenomenon can be seen most clearly in Greece, this partly due to the 
shortness of the authoritarian interlude and partly to the paralysis of all other 
potential candidates for supremacy (e.g., the army, the palace, or the church). 
The end of authoritarian rule thus made possible the transfer of power within 
the broader conservative bloc. Be that as it may, in the collective political 
consciousness of Greeks at transition time, Karamanlis had remained the 
former leader of the pre-dictatorship right-wing ERE. In Italy, the interwar 
Partito Popolare was suppressed in 1926 and yet "the work of Catholic Action 
went on and during those years [1926-1943] the men and women were formed 
who helped in the reconstruction of Christian Democracy in Italy after the 
W a r " . i n  point of fact, the founding Christian Democrats drew their roots 
from the Partito Popolare and, to a lesser extent, from the Catholic anti-fascist 
struggle led by Pietro Malvestiti. However, the DC became the dominant mass 
party aided by the unreserved support of the Catholic Church, itself Italy's 
most conservative institution. Things appear to be simpler in Spain where 
gradualism in regime change offered those who were "intimately involved 
with Francoism" a chance to play the crucial role of transferring the old, even
1® John N. Molony, The Emergence of Political Catholicism in Italy: Partito Popolare 1919- 



























































































if partially modified, loyalties to the regime already in the making.19 Until the 
Socialists won the elections of 1981, state power in Spain remained almost 
completely in the hands of leading figures from the antecedent regime. It was 
they, rather than outsiders, who, unable anymore to preserve Francoism's 
obsolete legacy, found it necessary to liquidate it.
It may well be said then that, considering the circumstances, it became the 
historical task of the conservatives to establish and reinforce the new 
democracies. Their success would depend heavily on the political parties they 
managed to create, to the genesis of which I now turn my attention.
The Italian DC was a successor party, in a non-linear order, to the interwar 
Partito Popolare, which disintegrated because of internal dissentions but also 
due to the fact that the Vatican had come to terms with Benito Mussolini. The 
freezing by the dictator of all party opposition in 1926 gave the deathblow to 
that early conservative formation. The modern party of Christian Democracy 
was founded in September 1942 at the house of the Milanese steel magnate 
Enrico Falck.20 The founders included a few old Popolare leaders (among 
them Alcide De Gasperi, who had been the last secretary general of that party) 
and some Catholic anti-fascists. They would soon be joined by members of the 
Catholic Graduate Association, including the future party leaders Aldo Moro 
and Giulio Andreotti. The main common characteristic of that assembly of 
political forces was strong hostility to fascism as well as communism, and an 
equally strong attachment to the Catholic church and traditional values. The 
church returned the courtesy by providing the newly-born party with 
members, legitimation and sponsoring. As the forces of the Resistance had *20
D  See Edward Malefakis, "Spain and its Francoist Heritage", in John H. Herz (ed.). From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies o f Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism 
(Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1982), esp. 215-16 for a discussion of the main consequences of 
the lack in Spain of a sharp break with the past.




























































































started gathering force, the Vatican abandoned in 1943 its earlier ideas of 
supporting a solution for Italy similar to Francoism. And, despite several 
misgivings, Pius XII decided to throw his support behind the nascent DC and 
helped to transform it from a mere “talking shop into a mass party".21
In Greece, the decision to create a new party instead of revitalizing the pre­
dictatorship ERE was indicative of Karamanlis's intentions. Only a few weeks 
after the reinstitution of democracy and still in an almost perfect vacuum of 
power, the former leader of the postwar right invited to his private apartment 
in Athens a group of political associates and confidants to announce his 
decisions. Among the invitees were Constantine Tsatsos, Panaghis 
Papaligouras, and Evangelos Averoff, all former ERE strongmen and destined 
to play important political roles in the future. As with DC's founding, the 
common denominator of all participants was their strong anti-communism 
and a solid preference for the virtues of non-excessive democracy. However, 
the initial legitimacy of the ND was of an altogether different kind. If the DC 
was established by the aid of a single religious institution, the ND was created 
(and therefore initially legitimated) by a single person, Constantine 
Karamanlis. For many years thereafter, this party would remain heavily 
dependent for legitimacy and reassurance on its founder's charisma 21 2
The creation of UCD in Spain had a rather more arduous development. This 
party was the final outcome of the continuous transformations since 1973 
when the reformists belonging to the Tacito group, in alliance with old 
aperturistas like Pio Cabanillas and José Maria Areizla, became the Partido
21 Ibid., 50.
22 There is no denying that Alcide De Gasperi and Adolfo Suarez proved outstanding 
statesmen and enjoyed enormous political prestige. Yet, only Karamanlis possessed charisma in 
the sense that this involved the delegation of power by a group to its authorized representative 
precisely in order to set new rules, this way redefining the accepted framework of politics. To use 
Panebianco's key words, while Karamanlis was perfectly able to "impose" his decisions upon his 
party, De Gasperi and Suarez were obliged to "bargain" with many other forces and political 
actors. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 





























































































Popular, and then, through the fusion of more smaller groups, the Centro 
Democratico.23 it was only when Adolfo Suarez, that “well-groomed member 
of the old Francoist elite",24 decided to enter the centrist coalition shortly 
before the first democratic elections of June 1977 that the UCD was bom. 
Sensing that the King's support was not sufficient, and also that he needed a 
popular base in society, the Prime Minister traded his enormous personal 
prestige with a party still in the making. Inevitably, the political center was to 
be transformed once more. The team of men from the old Movimiento that 
Suarez brought with him shared his reformist ideas and became instrumental 
in closing the gap within the new party between franquistas and anti- 
franquistas. Unlike its conservative kindred in Italy and Greece, however, 
UCD lacked a long-term logic of its own that would have enabled it to create 
enduring organizational structures and, perhaps, enjoy a longer life than the 
one it actually did. For, in reality, the Spanish conservative party always 
remained “first and foremost an organization set up by those in power with 
the purpose of preserving that power".25 As of the Alianza Popular, its 
creation was not at all different from that of the other conservative parties in 
Southern Europe. It originated from above, lacked both a coherent ideology 
and broad social legitimacy, and, in order to survive, it had to develop party 
organization structures. And yet it was unique in at least one crucial respect. 
Unlike most other major conservative parties in the region (the other 
exception being the Social Democrats in Portugal), the AP did not become a 
governing party at the time of its creation, nor, until recently, could it credibly 
expect to win power. This party presents therefore a very important case 
because, although almost doomed to be a permanent opposition, it succeeded 23*5
23 For these processes, see Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, Spain After 
Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986), 92-%.
24 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 217
25 Jose Amodia, "Union of the Democratic Centre", in David S. Bell (ed.). Democratic 




























































































in more than simply remaining alive; having managed to develop an 
impressive and firmly institutionalized party organization, the AP, renamed 
in the meantime the Partido Popular, seems at last ready to win office for the 
first time.
To sum up, as had already been the case with their respective 
democratizations, the creation of the new conservative parties in Italy, Greece 
and Spain did not originate at society's level. DC, ND, UCD, and AP/PP were 
conceived and come into political being from above, that is, by former 
conservative leaders and without the presence of significant pressures from 
below. All were founded amidst acute political crises, and (with the exception 
of the UCD) in power vacuums. All promised to fully concede to democracy 
and pledged no relation to sinister pasts. All were deeply anti-communist. 
None of those traits was however enough to keep them in power; the new 
conservatives were in need, more than anything else, of a brand new political 
program.
In transitory political systems that are also exposed to the dangers of sudden 
and high mass mobilization, conservative forces can hardly retain their 
intuitive inflexibility. Often in such cases, especially when those conservatives 
also happen to hold office, they find it necessary to turn reformist. The 
European South offers excellent cases to testify the foregoing. The political 
conservatism that grew in the region after the collapse of dictatorships owes its 
distinctiveness to two factors, the impact of democratic transitions themselves, 
which prompted change instead of nourishing stability, and the emergence for 
the first time of highly politicized societies, which demanded reform instead 
of falling back on tradition. To discount societies as an irrelevant entity proved 
no less impossible than ignoring the dynamics of transition. Thus, unable to 





























































































In all new democracies in Southern Europe the loudest (and more legitimacy- 
sensitive) demands were raised in the fields of political participation and 
social equality. The breakdown of dictatorships had rendered the practices of 
coercion and exclusion obsolete, and dramatically revealed deep social 
inequalities. Immediately after democratic transitions, the conservative forces 
in Southern Europe found themselves for the first time in their long political 
histories, in pressing need of providing two institutions they had never been 
quite at ease with, that is competitive political parties and generalized social 
welfare. It became therefore inevitable that, in order to establish new 
consensus in society, and in the face of strenuous opposition from both left 
and right, the goal of the conservative governments in Italy, Greece and Spain 
was to organize democratic polities capable of incorporating all groups in 
society and pacifying social conflict. These became the two components of the 
conservative democratic program. Incorporating society requires building 
strong parties, allowing them to organize autonomously from the state, 
formulating workable electoral laws, and encouraging social participation. 
Reducing tensions in society requires growing economies, solvent states, 
efficient allocation of resources, increasing opportunities and reducing 
inequality.
Once in power again, the main concern for the conservative governments in 
Italy, Greece and Spain became regulated  democracy, not democracy 
unlimited, all-permissive, at any cost. The issue was, in other words, how to 
establish (and make functional) moderate democracies in immoderate 
political conditions while, moreover, retaining political dominance.26 If this 
project was to succeed, it became imperative to bring citizens—sometimes 
caught for generations in authority systems that had been fundamentally non-
2° For Italy, see P. Scoppola, La Proposta Politica di De Gasperi (Bologna, Il Muilno, 1977); 
for Greece see mine, The Making of Party Democracy in Greece (Ph. D. thesis, Yale University, 




























































































participatory—into the new systems which were intended to accommodate 
only moderate and orderly participation. Heirs to a Madisonian (rather than 
Rousseauistic) conception of democracy,27 Alcide De Gasperi, Constantine 
Karamanlis, and Adolfo Suarez showed a clear preference to a relatively 
restrained type of democratic regime in which the main task of the people is to 
periodically control officials through elections, and no more. They all knew 
well that modern conservatism could no longer have resort to the tactics of 
the past. This simple realization represents for conservative thinking a 
momentous turning point. The new logic ensured that "[T]he outs are in, or 
must be brought in. The 'masses' not only cannot be kept out indefinitely, but 
it is useful to involve them. [For] if their emnity is dangerous, their 
indifference is wasteful."28
All things considered, the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy, the New 
Democrats (ND) in Greece, and the Centrist Union Democrats (UCD) in Spain, 
all governing parties in nascent democracies, became the most important 
means for the success of the conservative political programs in their 
respective country. In the new political context, the ruling conservatives 
exerted themselves to both incorporate societies in the sphere of politics and 
appease them as far as social demands were concerned. To be in a position to 
do so, they needed to provide strong (and institutionalized) political party 
organizations and supply sufficient (and universal) state welfare policies. In 
the following sections we shall explore in some detail these priorities of 
conservative strategy, namely the creation of party organizations (section 4) 
and the delivery of welfare benefits (section 5). My contention is that both 
components were necessary (but not sufficient) if the conservative strategy was 
to succeed. More important, they were anything but unrelated to each other 27
27 Cf. William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the 
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).
2® Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: 



























































































since welfare policy mainly involved resources generated at state level and 
delivered through the ruling political parties. It seems therefore necessary to 
examine the interrelations between the conservative parties and the state, as 
well as the extent to which this affected the success of the conservative 
program (section 6). After exploring these problem areas, I shall amend my 
analytical framework by introducing democratic legitimacy as an overall 
control variable for the success or failure of the conservatives in power 
(section 7).
1 8
4. The first component of conservative strategy:
Political incorporation through party organizations
Notwithstanding the almost century-long delay, democratic transitions in 
Southern Europe promoted the organization of the region's conservative 
forces in party form in a similar way that the Reform Act of 1867 had served 
Britain's Conservative Party. Indeed, in both cases "[T]he advent of democracy 
shattered the old framework of political society", and made necessary "the 
methodical organization of the electoral masses ... in the form of disciplined 
and permanent parties".29 The difference was, however, that not all southern 
European conservative parties could provide their own Disraelis for "stealing 
the Whigs' clothes" with success.
Democratization caused in Italy, Greece, and Spain an increase of checks at 
state level and a concomitant decrease of balances at the level of society. The 
repercussions of those developments were serious especially for the governing 
conservatives, given that, in the new political environment, they were set for 
the first time over against open societies without themselves having 
unlimited resort to the state or unaccountable accesss to state resources. Under *
M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (New York: Haskell




























































































the new conditions (and especially where polarization reached high levels, as 
in Italy and Greece), conservative forces had a clear interest in organizing 
strong party machineries, and mobilizing the support of large as well as active 
memberships both during and between elections. Instead of the historically 
passé coercion, it was now political parties that were deemed necessary for 
performing the double function of incorporating the once again mobilizing 
masses and accommodating them in the new democratic design.30 For the 
conservatives, it was the first time that political parties became central to 
organizing civil societies. Nonetheless, anti-party traditions and inherited 
habits were reflected clearly in the aggregative capacities of the modern 
conservative parties.
In Italy, the church did more than provide external legitimacy for the 
Christian Democrats. Its vast network of religious associations, the local parish 
clergy, and Azione Cattolica, the church's main lay organization all spoke in 
favor of DC to the (apparently inter-class) masses of religious men and women 
who flocked to Italy's churches every Sunday. Alongside these church- 
sponsored organizations, the party developed its own network of supports in 
society. Most important among them were the Coldiretti, an association of 
peasant proprietors founded by Paolo Bonomi, ACLI, the Association of 
Christian Workers, and Luigi Gedda's civic committees which had an 
extraordinary influence in Italian society in favor of the Christian Democrats. 
For Bardi and Morlino "the development of this party organizational network 
[was], in the final analysis, one of the most characteristic features of democratic 30
30 Witness, for instance, Karamanlis' rationale, which was quite typical of all conservative 
leaders in post-authoritarian southern Europe: "(In order for the moderate conservatives to keep 
democracy secure] they need tx)th to be alert and able to rally the people around powerful 
political formations, Iwhich alone can] not only protect democracy from communism and fascism, 
but also (avert] the causes that may have occassioned its breakdown in the past." Proclamation on 



























































































consolidation in Italy".31 Thanks to this church support, DC enjoyed a rapid 
growth, numbering already in 1945 more than half a million members.32 it 
may therefore seem prima facie paradoxical that both De Gasperi and Fanfani 
wanted to reinforce DC's organization and make it more autonomous from 
the church. The electoral failure of 1953 proved them just far-sighted. The 
Christian Democrats' poor performance at the polls (party support dropped by 
eight percentage points) was mainly due to continuing reliance on the church 
organizations and lack of effectiveness when compared to that of their 
political opponents. In the following year, Amintore Fanfani, a determined if 
somewhat abrasive personality, became secretary of the party and immediately 
set about revitalizing it. Under his secretaryship, the DC underwent a radical 
transformation from a typical denominational political force into a secular 
and uncofessional mass party. Fanfani's vigorous efforts yielded impressive 
results in terms of membership (by the end of his first secretaryship in 1959 it 
had exceeded 1.5 million) but were only partially successful in providing the 
party with a central bureaucracy and territorial diffusion so as to effectively 
eliminate its heavy dependence on external organizations and other political 
brokers. Thus, even after party reorganization, DC's institutionalization 
remained limited.33 There then followed the crisis of the centrist government 
formula and Italian politics entered an era of center-left coalition 
governments. Despite numerous attempts at "refoundation", DC failed to 
undergo significant organizational changes. Intense intra-party factionalism 
led to the temporary loss of DC's political dominance. Organizational reforms 
were once more put on the party agenda in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, 312
31 Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlino, "Italy: Tracing the Roots of the Great 
Transformation", in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and 
Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994), 244.
32 Among many sources on the growth of the DC membership until the late 1980s, see in 
particular Robert Leonardi and Douglas A. Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics 
of Dominance (London: MacMillan, 1989), 127.






























































































largely coinciding with the secretaryships of Benigno Zaccagnini and Ciriaco 
De Mita respectively.34 But again, the effort to overcome the power of 
factional leaders and increase the participation of the rank-and-file was in 
vain. In the meantime, the formerly strong ancillary party organizations 
originating from the Catholic subculture had progressively become weak or 
lost their relevance. Catholic Action, the Coldiretti, and the ACLI, suffered 
large membership drops and internal splits. And yet, DC remained a mass 
party maintaining relatively high levels of party membership at least until 
1990. In 1992, the new Party Secretary, Mino Martinazzoli made a last-ditch 
effort to "refound" the party. This attempt was too little and came too late. 
After almost half a century of political dominance, the DC certainly did not 
cease being a permanent governing party (and upholder of a compact 
conservative design) because it lacked organization. The disastrous losses in 
the 1993 elections and the final dissolution of the party in January 1994 were 
rather due to the dismantling of the hitherto established political system—a 
system which DC had played the principal role in creating and keeping alive.
The story of the Greek ND's organizational development in the 1970s is the 
laborious process of balancing a surplus of charisma at the top with serious 
deficits at the party institutional level. ND presents a rare case of a governing 
party that acquired formal organizational structures under the initial aegis of 
its charismatic leader. Like De Gaulle in 1958, Karamanlis in 1974 enjoyed an 
enormous amount of charismatic authority and yet, unlike the French leader, 
he decided to follow the example of non-charismatic De Gasperi in his 
determination to build a solid organization for his party. Karamanlis was fully 
aware that the stability of the regime depended to a large degree to the 
existence of strong political parties for both producing effective governments 34
34 By 1973 DC appears for the first time to have more members than the communist PCI. A 
new growth of members was experienced under De Mita's secretaryship between 1982 and 1986. 




























































































and incorporating a politically awakened civil society. That, of course, was the 
theory. In practice, the early attempts at party organization were seriously 
impeded by the leader's charisma, the party's incumbency in office, and the 
presence of powerful notables. Yet, throughout the whole period of 
Karamanlis' leadership, the tendency within the ND was towards eliminating 
autonomous centers of intraparty power while at the same time promoting 
mass-party organizational forms. The political design proposed by the ND 
necessitated incorporating the previously excluded masses in an orderly and 
enduring way.35 To be in a position to do so, it was understood that "a 
political party cannot exist for any reasonable length of time unless it is 
democratically organized so as not to identify its own fate with that of its 
leader".36 in this frame of mind, rather than intending the ND as a mere 
vehicle of his personal ambitions, Karamanlis undertook the task of creating a 
workable party machine for upholding and reinforcing his political design. As 
early as April 1977, a preliminary party congress produced a formal charter to 
regulate the party's inner life. Two years later, Karamanlis hastened to 
convene the first ND Congress in a deliberate effort to promote the 
"routinization of charisma" within the party.37 The major novelty of the new 
party charter was the reinforcement of power in the party parliamentary group 
and the introduction of controls on those aspiring to the party leadership after 
the departure of Karamanlis which took place in 1980 and meant for the party 
a sharp decline in charisma and a concomitant decrease in voter appeal. In the 
new post-Karamanlis environment, the theoretical justification for the need 
of rigid organizational structures started to change. Faced for the first time 
since the transition to democracy with the gloomy prospect of losing office and 356*
35 Takis S. Pappas, "'New Democracy': Party Development and Organization Logics", in 
Piero Ignazi (ed.), Party Organization in Southern Europe (New York: Greenwood, forthcoming).
36 Constantine Karamanlis, Speech at the Preliminary Congress of ND, 2 April 1977.
In Weberian parlance, this involves the transformation of charismatic authority from its 
purest form (i.e., personal and extraordinary power) into a more permanent structure 




























































































under the mounting competition from PASOK, emphasis in the ND 
organization shifted from intra-party affairs to inter-party conflict and from 
institutional formalism to electoral mobilization. When the ND lost the 
general elections of 1981, its party organization proved that it was more than 
an empty shell. The party had in fact been institutionalized and, unlike the 
UCD in a similar situation, did not disintegrate. To the contrary, it responded 
with one more change in party leadership (Evangelos Averoff replacing Rallis) 
and continuous development of its party organization.
At formation time, the Union of the Democratic Center had no dependence 
on any external sponsor organizations and also lacked a charismatic leader. 
Instead, it was a product of diffusion caused by the federation of pre-existing 
political formations.3® After the 1977 general elections in Spain, the UCD 
made an effort to become something more than a motley collection of political 
families—Christian democrat, social democrat, liberal, independent reformist, 
former Francoist—coordinated from above simply for electoral purposes. In 
December of that year, the various groups within the coalition formally 
dissolved and UCD became a single party with some of the organizational 
traits of a mass party, such as an executive committee and party branches 
throughout the country.39 Yet, it never ceased relying for organizational 
support and resources principally on three sources: the popularity of its leader, 
the network of local notables (caciquismo in fact remained one of the most 
persistent characteristics of Spanish political life), and the government's 
control over state television. The first UCD Congress in 1978 further 
centralized party leadership by effectively introducing a presidential structure 
that unified all the coalition partners from the constituent period. But this did 
not give vent to internal conflicts and dissenting voices, nor did it manage to *39
3° Here I use "diffusion" in Panebianco's own sense, Political Parlies, 51, 65.
39 By 1981, the UCD had managed to attract 144,000 party members, a number higher than




























































































coordinate the various groups in a better way. On the other hand, the leader 
failed to offer organizational incentives to the party rank-and-file or broaden 
the structure of political opportunities. The passing of the Constitution at the 
end of 1978 "effectively marked the achievement of Suarez's political project, 
leaving him without a clear set of objectives".40 The leader became a mixed 
blessing. Though still popular, Suarez was non-charismatic, and his marriage 
with UCD was one of political convenience. The leader offered the party his 
personal popularity, and the party (the most liberal groups within it in 
particular) reciprocated by providing the leader with much-needed democratic 
legitimacy. As it turned out, Suarez took greater advantage of the party than it 
did of him. Reduced to being a personal political vehicle for its leader's 
ambitions, the party failed completely to institutionalize an organization that 
could secure a viable future for itself.^! Strained internally by the 
heterogeneity of its constituent groups, lacking external supports other than 
the state, and dominated by a leader without charismatic qualities, the UCD 
finally exploded. A series of political setbacks in 1979 and 1980 (the elections 
for the autonomous Basque and Catalan parliaments, the Andalusian 
referendum, and a censure motion in 1980) led Suarez to resign in January 
1981. As Hopkin attests, "[T)he decline of Adolfo Suarez's leadership brought 
the collapse of a model of party management which had emerged out of his 
initial dominance of the organisation, and which depended on his continued 
dominance to function effectively''.^ Immediately afterwards, the party 
abandoned the presidential system and separated the posts of parliamentary 
leader (which was assumed by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo) and party leader (which 4012
40 Jonathan Hopkin, Party Development and Party Collapse: The Case of Union De Centro 
Democratico in Post-Franco Spain (Ph. D. thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 1995),
232.
41 J. Figuero captures nicely the situation by entitling his study on this party UCD: La 
Empresa Que Creo Adolfo Suarez; Historia, Sociologia y Familias del Suarismo (Barcelona: 
Grijalbo, 1981) [UCD: The Business Enterprise Created by Adolfo Suarez; History, Sociology and 
the Families of Suarism); cited in Amodia, "Union of the Democratic Centre", 12.




























































































remained in the hands of men loyal to Suarez). Worse was yet to come. After a 
few months the party split, and while the social democratic component went 
over to the Socialists its more conservative sectors moved in the opposite 
direction towards the right-wing AP. Certain Christian democratic sections 
formed their own party (Partido Democratico Popular), which would later 
form a coalition with the AP. Suarez and his followers also created a new 
centrist party, the Social and Democratic Center (CDS) that was not destined to 
have a bright future either. Calvo Sotelo failed to rescue UCD from defeat in 
the general elections of 1982 and, eventually, complete disappearance. Shortly 
before the national elections of 1982, the UCD seemed to be totally eclipsed by 
Fraga's conservative AP.43 Thenceforth, the latter would become yet another 
incarnation of conservatism in Spain.
The Alianza Popular was founded at the end of 1976 by Manuel Fraga heading 
a coalition of former Francoist ministers and this continuity from the 
previous regime would remain that party's most serious and permanent 
liability. AP's first three years were spent in an effort to moderate the party 
image, as well as to formulate an appropriate party-building strategy. The 1979 
electoral outcome was a serious setback given that its electoral support fell to 
just 6.1 percent of the total vote. Ironically, it was electoral defeat that gave the 
party a new life. As the UCD started disintegrating, the AP conservatives began 
an extensive process of organizational growth. During its Third National 
Congress held in December 1979, the party became strictly presidential, 
eliminated many ideological inconsistencies of the past, and developed a new 
electoral strategy formulated around the concept of "natural majority".44 
Competent organization had become a constant preoccupation of the party 43
43 Jonathan Marcus, "The Triumph of Spanish Socialism: The 1982 Election," West European 
Politics 6:3 (July 1983): 281-86.
44 José Ramón Monterò, "Los Fracasos Politicos y Electorales de la Derecha Espafiola: Alianza 





























































































leadership as the best means of mobilizing mass support and winning 
elections. In 1982 membership stood at 100,000, and in 1986 it reached 
222.000.^5 Yet, the electoral results in both years were disappointing. Despite 
significant transfers by the Spanish voters of political allegiance to the 
coalition led by the AP, the latter remained in opposition. However, party 
activity was never relaxed.4b More importantly, the party underwent two 
leadership changes (Antonio Mancha in 1987 and José Maria Aznar in 1989) 
and announced its "re-foundation" in a clear attempt to present a more 
centrist image. In 1989 it also changed its name into Partido Popular (PP).
The foregoing alert us to two things with respect to the interrelated processes 
of party building and democracy making. The first is that the major 
conservative parties in Southern Europe developed in different ways. Italy's 
Christian Democrats owe their consolidation as a party to the existence of an 
external sponsor institution. In Greece, the single most decisive factor for 
conservative party-building was the presence of charismatic leadership. The 
Spanish conservative parties were created through diffusion of elites.47 
However distinct their circumstances, all conservative parties facilitated 
participation. They provided the new democracies major avenues for bringing 
the people into politics. Their party organizations helped enlist mass support 
and mediate claims and demands coming from society's side to the state.
5. The second component of conservative strategy:
Social conflict mediation through state welfarism 45*
45 Cotarelo and Lopez Nieto, "Spanish Conservatism, 1976-87", 88.
46 Displaying extraordinary activism for a conservative party, the AP has called no less than 
eleven party congresses from its foundation in 1976 until 1993. For details of the party's 
organizational growth, see Lourdes Lopez Nieto, "The Party Mechanism: The Organization and 
Operations of the AP/PP Political Party", in Ignazi (ed.). Party Organization in Southern Europe, 
forthcoming.
4  ̂ For an analysis of the factors affecting party formation and party development, see 




























































































Demand for political participation was only one of the two great consequences 
brought about by the advent of democracies and the emergence of civil 
societies in Southern Europe; the other was the rise of expectations in the 
social and economic fields—expressed as strong requests for fairness and 
equity. Compared to the former exclusive systems that had been either 
indifferent or unable to satisfy this sort of demands/*® the new conservative 
projects, by aiming at societal reconciliation, became to a large extent 
dependent for their success upon the satisfactory delivery of welfare programs.
When authoritarianism collapsed, the economies of Italy, Greece and Spain 
were in a sorry state. Though in different mixes, they all suffered from 
inflation and large trade deficits; obsolete industries and low levels of 
production; antiquated agricultural sectors and inefficient bureaucracies; high 
unemployment and declining investments. Under those conditions, the 
double challenge facing all conservative governments in Southern Europe 
was to promote economic growth and to decrease social inequalities. Each 
opted for economic programs of an essentially Keynesian conception designed 
along two axes. The first entailed a strong state capable of organizing the 
general workings of the economy and regulating it against cyclical crises; the 
second axis included generous socioeconomic redistributions favoring those 
with lower incomes. This strategy, which was intended to produce "a kind of 
economistic sublimation of politics",49 seemed at the time wise from the 
political point of view and rational from the economic point of view.
Contrary to the original design, however, it was redistribution, not economic 
development, that became the more important. Economic rationality thus fell 
an easy victim to political expediency. The dilemma facing these conservative *49
4°  With the partial exception, it should be noted, of the corporatist welfare state in interwar 
Italy.
49 Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Stanford: Stanford 




























































































governments was, in Maravall's words, "either taking their country on a long 
and painful road toward economic efficiency and long-term growth, with 
dubious prospects of economic or political success and postponing the rewards 
that many people expected from democracy, or attempting to respond to more 
immediate political and social needs, delaying the implementation of 
economic reforms and hoping the economy could muddle through".50 
Typically enough, conservatives everywhere, instead of aiming at a reformist 
"economicization of politics" that would have allowed the state to play the 
leading role in the economy, subscribed to a conformist "politicization of 
economics". Strictly political considerations prevailed over general economic 
ones, and catering to the needs of different sections of electorates acquired 
primacy over general economic planning. The picture comes out quite clearly 
if we measure welfare policies by (a) public spending as a share of GDP and (b) 
increases in the size of the public-controlled sectors in the economies. To be 
sure, such random welfarism made sense to the masses, but was senseless in 
terms of the overall economic processes since those took place without regard 
for macroeconomic hierarchies. Throughout the years of conservative 
political dominance, instead of bold structural reforms to redress economies, it 
was the unproductive sectors of states and public expenditures that increased 
at a fast rate.
A remark is in order. It has often been argued that the advancement of social 
policies in Italy has been a "distinctively Christian democratic" and 
"religiously inspired" phenomenon upon which the dominant DC capitalized 
in order to pursue its conservative political project.51 Yet, to say that the 50*
50 Jose Maria Maravall, "Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe", in Luiz 
Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall, and Adam Przeworski (eds.), Economic Reforms in 
New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 80.
For a recent exposition of this idea, see Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study 





























































































"social capitalistic" reformism pursued by the DC was merely related to 
religious ideals does not explain the pursuit of similar policies in comparable 
political conditions by the non-confessional ND or the non-predominantly- 
Catholic UCD. A more convincing answer lies, I think, in the strictly political 
predicaments all conservative parties in the countries under examination 
faced, and which revolved around the double issue of mitigating the impact of 
suddden popular mobilization and placating the political opposition. In the 
new democracies, the achievement of social equality and justice through state 
intervention appeared as new elements to conservative thinking. In Greece, 
for instance, the promotion of social justice became, inter alia, one of the main 
principles and ideological themes of the ND.52 Similarly, the UCD also 
stressed the principle of social equality, emphasizing "the obligation of the 
public authorities to assure the predominance of the common interest over 
individual interests as well as the fundamental services of a modern society, 
and to guarantee justice and social equality".53 The following statement 
minister Ugo La Malfa included in a 'supplementary note' in the 1962 Italian 
budget best depicts the understanding of the welfare state and its tasks by the 
Southern conservatives:
In order to guarantee to everyone a decent standard of living, the direct intervention of the state 
must be strengthened ... Under state authority are in fact (besides education) health 
assistance— which must be adequate and effective for all citizens, regardless o f their financial 
conditions—and social insurance, which must guarantee everyone a minimum security for lifeP4
Paradoxical as it may have been for conservative parties, there was a strong 
ethos of social democracy, not of neocapitalism, "resonating" in the 
government programs of southern European conservatives.55 There is a 5234
52 Cf. The Ideological Principles o f New Democracy (in Greek) (Athens: New Democracy, 
1975).
53 La Solucion a Un Reto: UCD. Tests Para Una Sociedad Democrdtica Occidental (Madrid: 
Union Editorial, 1979), quoted in Luis Garcia San Miguel, "The Ideology of the Uni6n de Centro 
Democratico", European journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 443.
54 Quoted in Maurizio Ferrera, "Italy", in Peter Flora (ed.). Growth To Limits: The Western 
European Slates Since World War II (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 2:392 
(emphases added).



























































































catch. While in the social democratic model the aim is the reallocation of risks 
by way of state-undertaken general economic reforms, "equality" in the 
Southern European countries mostly referred to the state-initiated 
redistribution of wealth through particularistic policies.56 Equality in 
Southern Europe was perceived to derive, not indirectly through economic 
politics, but directly through state action and especially state social policies.
In the aftermath of the 1948 elections, a victorious De Gasperi promised to 
carry out the social policy reforms to which he was pledged. Social reformism 
and the quest for social justice, accompanied by appropriate policies, remained 
prominent on the conservative political agenda.5? The agrarian reform laws 
of 1950, providing for land expropriations and their subsequent redistribution 
to sharecropping farmers and other small peasants, were only the first step 
towards that direction. Despite high political immobilism during the 1950s, 
that decade was crucial in that the Christian Democrats managed to reinforce 
their hold on the state and to create a new consensus in Italian society. The 
institution of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was perhaps the most characteristic 
example of such tactics. The Cassa (fund) was an extensive undertaking of 
public-works and infrastructure-building projects especially concentrated in 
rural areas. By increasing investment and stimulating economic growth in 
underpriviledged areas, the Christian Democrats had hoped to achieve more 
than the indirect redistribution of wealth and consumption rise. Above all, 
they had also expected to mediate growing social protest. The application of 
social policies, especially related to welfare extension, regional development, 
and full employment, continued into the following decade despite the 
economic recession of the years 1964-5. 56*
30
56 Peter Baldwin, The Politics o f Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare
State 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
5? Maurizio Ferrera, II Welfare State in Italia: Sviluppo a Crisi in Prospettiva Comparata 



























































































The political realignments of the 1960s did not halt Italy's idiosyncratic state 
welfarism. On the contrary, it was center-left governments that carried out the 
nationalization of the electric power industry and the more egalitarian 
education reforms in the early 1960s. Later in the same decade, and after mass 
protests, the Christian Democrats agreed to grand generous social pensions. At 
around the same time, an extensive reform of the national health service 
introduced the general insurance scheme in place of a more fragmented 
system. The extension of social rights and welfare spending continued into the 
1970s and the 1980s (the biggest items remaining education, health provision, 
and the pensions), causing an ever-rising public-sector deficit. Public spending 
and public employment increased dramatically throughout the whole era of 
conservative dominance in Italy. The growth of public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP increased from 24.8 percent in 1951 to 45.7 percent in 1980 
following a more or less linear trend.58 The major component of public 
spending has been social expenditure, its share of GDP rising from 13 to almost 
27 percent, and sometimes, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, growing at a 
faster rate than real GDP.59 State employment increased in the post-war period 
at a pace similar to that of public expenditure. From 10.3 percent employed in 
the public sector in 1951, their numbers had more than doubled in 1976, 
reaching 22 percent of the Italian labor force 60
In Greece and Spain, the importance of political considerations at the relative 
expense of economic rationality was similarly evident in the reforms 
undertaken by the ruling conservative after democratic transitions. In these 
two countries structural problems were worsened by the consecutive oil-price *60
5® Ferrer a, "Italy", 393-4. According to different sources, perhaps somewhat excessive, public
expenditure had risen in Italy by 1982 to no less than 55 percent of GDP, the highest of all major 
western European countries; Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 354.
Ferrera, ibid., 395, 443 and passim. The most important items within social expenditure 
have been those concerning income maintenance (with pensions figuring most prominently), health 






























































































shocks of the 1970s. The ever rising cost of oil increased the already 
uncompetitive costs of production, squeezed profits, and forced many 
industrial firms out of business. As foreign debts mounted, unemployment, 
which had been low in earlier years, now emerged as a new threat. The 
response to crisis of the Greek ND is perhaps the most telling because, unlike 
its counterparts in Italy or Spain, this party had been able to form strong 
majoritarian governments, which means that the ND decided to make the 
generous social and economic concessions it made deliberately, that is without 
being pressed by the (at leat numerically, incommensurate) opposition. Under 
the weight of demands for increased social welfare and more equality, the 
Karamanlis government applied a massive program of nationalizations in the 
economy, thus bringing under state control many key industries, as well as the 
banks and telecommunications. In addition, the ND set up a consortium of 
state-owned banks in order to stimulate investment in those areas where 
private capital was failing.61 State resources were then used to finance the 
budgets for education, health insurance, and social security.
The picture was not very different in Spain. Leading a minoritarian 
government, Suarez was in a less favorable condititon than Karamanlis in 
Greece, but was still able to strike successful deals over social and economic 
policies with the political opposition. Democratization caused a wave of social 
demands that included the satisfaction of material (e.g., wages), as well as non­
material (e.g., education) rights. In trying to respond to such an upsurge of 
demands, the Spanish government, like the Greek and the Italian ones, 
encouraged the extension of socioeconomic rights and state expansion. As 
Castles notes, "the government that presided over the really significant 61
61 To the stated explanation of ND's leader, those "bold interventions (were ] within the 
limits of a market economy [and not implemented) out of dogmatism but because the sorial and 
economic conditions made them necessary" Constantine Karamanlis, Speech at the First Congress 




























































































expansion of the welfare state [in Spain] was the Suarez administration".^ if 
we take up again now the two main themes underlying the emergence of the 
welfare state in Greece and Spain, namely public expenditure and expansion of 
the state-controlled sector, we see between them both similarities and 
differences. In terms of public spending, first, both countries followed a similar 
pattern of spectacular increase. According to one estimation, public 
expenditure in Greece rose from 30.8 percent of GNP in 1974 to 35.2 percent in 
1978 and around 42 percent in 1979, with unstoppable upward tendencies.63 in 
similar fashion, public spending in Spain increased from 24.9 percent of GDP 
in 1975 to 38.0 percent in 1982.64 fn public employment, we observe different 
pictures. In Greece, as in Italy, the public sector of the economy was 
enormously increased in the initial years after democratic transition. Spanish 
state jobs not only remained stable, but were in fact reduced in the 1980s due to 
the PSOE policies on "industrial reconversion".
To sum up and conclude this section, the success of the conservative 
democratic program in Italy, Greece and Spain required, besides potent party 
organizations, the provision of social citizenship rights, which were granted in 
the form of welfare entitlements and/or state jobs. In all three countries, the 
massive growth of social expenditure offered welfare benefits to many social 
categories and groups. Although those policies had a particularistic and 
selective nature, in that they tended to favor some regions (e.g., 
underdeveloped areas such as Italy's South), some social groups (e.g., 
pensioners everywhere) or certain occupational categories (e.g., public 
employees and the self-employed), they managed nonetheless to provide a 6234
62 Francis G. Castles, "Welfare State Development in Southern Europe", West European 
Politics 18:2 (April 1995), 306.
63 Constantine Colmer, "The Greek Economy at a Crucial Turning-Point: Political Reality 
Versus Social Aspirations", in the collective volume The New Liberalism: The Future of Non- 
Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S. (Athens: KPEE, International Symposium, May 
1981).




























































































very broad range of beneficiaries with the material means for their 
reproduction. The continuous increase of the public sector created more and 
more state jobs and, hence, state dependencies in Italy and Greece. The social 
policies of the conservatives reduced sharp economic inequalities in societies. 
Large sectors in society managed to improve their positions and were 
successfully brought into the center of political systems thanks to state 
assistance.
6. Bringing the parts of conservative strategy together:
Party institutionalization through state colonization
The emphasis has been, thus far, on examining the two main elements of the 
conservative democratic program separately. Let us now turn to the following 
issues: How these two elements interrelated to each other so as to produce 
their cumulative political outcome; and how successful was that outcome in 
Southern Europe's actual politics.
Beginning with the second issue, I will take success (or, inversely, failure) for 
each conservative party in Southern Europe to be a function of three 
objectives: democratic consolidation; longevity in office; and survival after 
electoral defeat. Consolidation of democracy was the stated objective of all 
conservative parties in Italy, Greece and Spain. By and large, in this respect all 
three governing parties present success stories. Yet, democracy is more than a 
goal in itself. Political elites, in particular, are likely to view it as a means to 
prolonging their own rule. If we therefore take longevity in office as our 
measure of success, the DC scores very high, having held office for forty-five 
years, while ND and the UCD, with seven and five years in office respectively, 
cannot boast a comparable success.65 Finally, it is also possible to measure 
success by the durability of the conservative parties after electoral defeat and 65
65 The record of ND in this respect is certainly improved by adding up the three years it 




























































































the loss of government. On this count, only the ND—and, albeit permanently 
in opposition, the AP/PP—have really been successful.
Since the first of the foregoing measures of success applies without significant 
degrees of variation to all three parties, we may as well dismiss it. We get 
more discriminatory power by measuring success in terms of party duration in 
office, or durability after losing it. On these grounds, the UCD alone fails to 
qualify as a successful case. This party offered the Spanish electorate generous 
social benefits (but no state jobs) but failed to stimulate participation and build 
a party mechanism able to solidify its support, as well as fend off attacks from 
the opposition. Eventually, the Socialists outbid the UCD by outpromising it 
in terms of social policies and fighting elections more efficiently on account of 
their better organization. Since the UCD disappeared so quickly, we are forced 
to ask: Why did this party fail where its ideological-and-political counterparts 
in Italy and Greece succeeded? My contention is that the party organizations of 
DC and ND became permanent and strongly institutionalized, largely because 
these parties managed to take advantage of their role as public-office holders, 
thus succeeding in occupying the state and controlling its functions.
Party institutionalization is therefore a convenient point from which to 
explore the issue. It has recently been argued that no conservative party in 
Southern Europe has ever been fully institutionalized. Absence of 
institutionalization is attributed to: (a) the failure to successfully diffuse 
disparate loyalties within parties (as in UCD); (b) weak party cohesion, despite 
successful routinization of charisma (as in ND); or (c) the impediments posed 
by outside sponsoring organizations (as in DC).66 This theory suffers from two 
drawbacks, the first associated with its heavy reliance on the genetic model of 
parties, and the second with its bias towards examining parties only in relation *



























































































to societies, not s t a t e s . Y e t ,  parties evolve and develop, and, while they do 
so, the state hardly remains a variable exogenous to that process.
One may argue, as Panebianco does, that party institutionalization is "the way 
[party] organization 'solidifies'".68 Yet, just asking how  this occurs is not 
enough. There is also need to find out where institutionalization takes place, 
to determine in other words its location within the polity. This may well 
happen at society's level, but it also may happen at the level of state. To better 
capture this issue, 1 suggest we proceed on the basis of the following four 
premises:
1. Conservatives in power build party organizations in order to bring societies 
into democratic politics (and win votes).
2. Conservatives in power control the state and its welfare institutions, so they 
may determine who gets what and how much in terms of welfare and state 
jobs.
3. Welfare benefits and state jobs tend to increase in order to moderate social 
conflict (and win more votes to the ruling conservatives).
4. Welfare benefits and state jobs, however, retain a particularistic character, 
since they are only granted to specific social categories.
Premises (1) and (3) summarize the major components of the conservative 
strategy in newly democratized Southern Europe, as well as their objectives. 
Yet, no matter how increased in volume, the allocation of welfare benefits and 
state jobs remains discretionary (4) and dependent upon the parties that enjoy 
power—for as long as they do so (2).69 The ruling conservatives were in a 
position to control welfare patronage to the degree that their respetive parties 
were able to occupy the state. By interposing themselves between the input 
and the output ends of the clientelist channels, the conservative parties could 6789
67 Ibid., 49-68. Curiously, while this author admits that one of the ways for measuring 
institutionalization is "the organization's degree of autonomy vis-a-vis its environment" (p. 55), 
one understands by "environment" only dynamics generated at society level, the state never 
entering the picture.
68 Ibid., 49.
69 Cf, Peter Mair, "Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege", West 




























































































act as "collective patrons to their active supporters who became the clients of 
the state."70 Thus having settled the matter, we may now confidently say that 
it was at the state, not at society level, that the Italian and the Greek 
conservative parties obtained institutionalization.
The sudden increase of party power in Italy and Greece, as well as the ability of 
parties in government to conquer the state, caused the adaptive adjustment of 
time-honored clientelistic practices.70 1 723It is not an accident, of course, that 
political science borrows directly from the Italian political vocabularly to 
describe these processes as partitocrazia and sottogoverno7^  The linkage of 
these phenomena created a new kind of state clientelism which, contrary to 
the traditional clientelistic practices, was rationalized by political parties. The 
characteristics of this new, post-authoritarian clientelism (as contrasted to 
forms of traditional clientelism) may be summed up as follows:7  ̂ (i) The units 
involved in the clientelist exchange are not local notables and their political 
friends nor the state and the citizens in an autonomous fashion, but office­
holding parties and their organized membership; (if) The criteria for 
admission in such political transactions are not personal acquaintance at the 
local level nor even loyalty to the state, but some proof of party-membership; 
(ii'O The form and type of relationship is not informal and achieved nor semi- 
formal and ascribed, but rather formal and attained; (iv) The channeling of 
demands takes place not vertically, via disparate individual patrons, loose 
parties, or a haphazard chain of state associates, but horizontally, via
70 Dimitrios A. Sotiropoulos, "A Colossus With Feet of Qay: The State in Post- 
Authoritarian Greece", in Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds.), Greece, the 
New Europe, and the Changing International Order (New York: Pella, 1993), 47.
7 ' For Italy, see Massimo Paci, "II Sistema di Welfare Italiano fra Tradizione Clientelare e 
Prospettive di Riforma", in Ugo Ascoli (ed.), Welfare State all' ltaliana (Bari: Laterza, 1984), 
297-326.
72 Partitocrazia means exacly what the word says; sottagoverno is a generalized and abusive 
system of patronage operated by the organizations of political parties and based on political 
jobbery and the exchange of reciprocal favors.





























































































permanent party organizations; (v) In such flows of demands and claims, 
gatekeeping is performed neither at the private nor the state level, but at the 
level of ruling political parties; (vi) The overriding political rationale of 
patrons is, therefore, not the maintenance and/or expansion of local power 
bases nor the isolation of dissidents, but enhancing the governing party's 
staying power; and, finally, (vii) The main function performed by such 
clientelistic exchanges is not the primordial incorporation of societies into the 
political system nor its organization by state controls, but the reproduction of 
the governing parties' own rule.
To recapitulate, the system of welfare patronage that developed particularly in 
Italy and Greece for the first time after the establishment of democratic politics 
and under conservative rule, became feasible thanks to the success of the 
conservative political program itself. It was, in other words, the simultaneous 
existence of sufficiently organized political parties, as well as the necessity of 
delivering more social welfare and more state jobs, that made possible the 
conquest of the state. By fusing their own political organizations with the state 
(and, therefore, subsidizing the activities of the former with the functions of 
the latter), the ruling conservative parties in Italy and Greece effectively 
transformed themselves into state parties.74 By then, party organizations had 
already turned into mere "technical instruments, designed as means to 
definite goals"75—the prolongation of conservative rule through the effective 
conquest of the state and its welfare institutions. The politics of party 
patronage became so convenient and politically rewarding to governments 
that they were preserved even after the conservatives had been removed 
from power. As appears especially from the cases of the socialist PASOK in
74 Donolo, for instance, describes the DC as "a party which tends to identify itself with state 
institutions, thus investing itself with an authority properly that of the state"; Carlo Donolo, 
"Social Change and Transformation of the State in Italy", in Richard Scase (ed.). The State in 
Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 165.




























































































Greece and the PSOE in Spain, partisan patronage was in fact enriched with 
more qualities, so as to better exclude the opposition parties from the 
privileges associated with office, and already seems to have become a 
permanent feature of democracy in Southern Europe.
7. Accessory requisites for the success of conservative strategy: 
Ideological legitimacy and the directions of party competition
The success of the conservative democratic programs in Southern Europe 
depended on the existence of party organizations (to uphold the programs by 
bringing people into politics) and the development of welfare states (to satisfy 
demands for social equality and justice). The ruling conservatives in Italy and 
Greece furnished both requirements for democracy-building to a remarkable 
degree. Spain's UCD was less successful, hence its fast eclipse after only five 
years in power. This hardly harmed democracy, however, especially since the 
political program of the Socialists was nowhere significantly different from 
that of their conservative predecessors. This raises the question: If presenting a 
well worked-out strategy was an absolutely necessary condition for the success 
of the conservative project in Italy and Greece (and Spain), was it also a 
sufficient one for keeping the conservative parties in these two countries in 
power (longer than in Spain)? And, if yes, why the Italian Christian Democrats 
were in this respect far more successful than the Greek ND? In this section, I 
am going to introduce legitimacy as an explanatory variable for prolonging 
conservative rule, mostly confining the analysis to Greece and Italy.
Loaded with unfavorable political legacies, without entirely untainted images, 
and with plenty of reactionary leftovers in their ranks,76 conservatives in both 
countries needed to furnish hard evidence of having severed past ties with
76 The "purification" of the new regimes from fascists, when undertook at all, remained 
partial and incomplete. In all three countries many anti-democrats remained firmly in positions 




























































































their anti-democratic progenitors. Ordinary people in all Southern Europe 
have long memories, and no party organization nor any amount of social 
welfare could buy off their desire for justice. In political cultures that have 
been replete with ideological symbolisms pertaining particularly to the 
division between left and right/^ and where party identities are forged and 
political groups are largely made on the basis of symbolic legitimacy, it was a 
crucial matter for the old conservatives to appear in new clothes and speak in 
different voices than in the past. To put it simply, images mattered and if the 
self-proclaimed reformist conservatives were to offset past debits with recent 
credits, they needed to dissociate themselves from their often reprobate pasts 
and look for new symbolic legitimacy. In trying to take clear distances from the 
non-legitimate right, the typical response of moderate conservatives was to 
move closer to the political center. In point of fact, centripetalism presented to 
them more than the only solution available. It also seemed to fit well the post- 
authoritarian conservative political design, since it promoted political 
moderation and convergence while discouraging ideological polarization and 
divergence.
Political culture in Southern Europe has always been characterized by anti­
conservative political beliefs (such as anarchosyndicalism or socialism) which, 
even when they do not become dominant, typically enjoy a widespread, albeit 
diffuse, legitimacy in civil societies. It is hard to find any similarly coherent 
belief that draws from moderate conservative principles and has become 
broadly accepted by societies. It was this lack of generally recognizable and 
legitimate ideological underpinnings, in combination with the fear of 
remaining associated with the reactionary right, that forced all post­
authoritarian liberal conservatives in Southern Europe to develop strong
™ Richard Gunther and José R. Montero, "The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative 
Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies", in Richard Gunther et al., 



























































































centripetal drives. If a valid claim to legitimacy would not be easily made by 
positive ideology alone, it could certainly be evidenced had moderate 
conservatives managed to captivate one of the legitimate positions on the 
ideological spectrum of party competition. This is why the tendency to occupy 
the middle ground in politics, by offering electorates both verbal (political 
rhetoric) and pragmatic (real policies) assurances, and which is known as 
cen trism o, centrism, became for the moderate conservatives of such 
paramount importance. The center seemed to offer the conservatives ideal 
positioning for implementing their programs and securing their dominance. 
Thereupon, following Milton's advise, "from the centre, thrice to th' utmost 
poll".
Politics, however, is seldom the domain of mere wishful thinking. Although 
both the DC and the ND exhibited strong centripetal drives, only the former 
managed to occupy (or be perceived as occupying) the political-cwm-ideological 
center. ND remained unable to capture the center and, for this, it lost power 
despite the success of its democratic program. Why did things happen the way 
they happened in the two countries?
Centripetal movement along the left-to-right dimension is not unrestrained. 
To the contrary, physical centripetalism is curbed, and sometimes halted, (a) by 
the existence of opposition from the extreme right, and (b) the existence of 
other parties on the center and center-right. It moreover depends (c) on the 
type of party system and (d) the "elasticity" of the space of competition.'7® 
Given such constraints and dependencies, the issue is to find out how far the 
moderate conservative parties in Italy and Greece were able to travel 
centerward. Ideological centripetalism, on the other hand, depends on the
^  The latter two points are raised, and explained, by Sartori. More specifically, polarized 
pluralist systems do pressupose the "center placement of a party" (which could well be a 
conservative one). The concept of "space elasticity', as is used by the same author, indicates how 
long or how short is each time the length of space between conservatives and the center. Sartori, 



























































































symbolic strategies of the competing political forces and the degree they 
manage to manipulate symbolic associations to their favor. By using this 
variable, we shall be in a position to attest how close to the center were the 
conservatives actually permitted to approach by their ideological opponents. 
Generally speaking, physical occupation involves a war of positions, while 
symbolic occupation entails a war of words.
The case of the Italian Christian Democrats is perhaps the clearest. DC secured 
its center positioning because of the dynamics of an extremely polarized 
political system characterized by bilateral oppositions. With the Cold War 
rampant for the most part of modern Italian history, the struggle between the 
Christian Democrats and the Communists was presented as a choice between 
civilizations, thus locking large segments of the Italian society into antipodal 
partisan affiliations remaining until recently in virulent opposition to each 
other. Right-wing opposition came mainly from the fascist Movimiento 
Sociale Italiano (MSI)/9 a typical anti-system party seeking to undermine 
democratic legitimacy and, hence, the Christian democratic political project 
itself. Anti-fascism became one of the dominant themes in postwar Italian 
politics, and, particularly in the northern and central regions of the country, it 
was emphasized by the Christian Democrats no less forcefully than by the 
Communists. Despite the significant failures of epurazione, DC was from the 
very beginning careful to keep a clear distance from the remnants of fascism, 
its leaders defining it as "a party of the center looking at the left" (in De 
Gasperi's words) and which was at the same time "popular and anti-fascist" (in 
Moro's words). Consequently, DC was obliged to draw a clear demarcating line 
between itself and the right, and move centerward. The eligibility of MSI for 
coalitions with the Christian Democrats remained an officially taboo subject in 
Italy. Until the late 1960s, DC relied for coalition-building on a variety of
Opposition to the Christian democrats also came from the Monarchists until their party 





























































































smaller centrist parties such as the Liberals, Republicans, or Social Democrats, 
always careful to exclude the far right, whether monarchical or not.80 And 
when the heterogeneity of the center coalition parties presented unsolvable 
problems, the Christian Democrats, in almost exemplary imitation of pre­
fascist transformist practices, invited into the governmental coalition the 
parties of the left, still excluding the ultras of the right.81
Like in Italy, the political situation in Greece after democratic reinstitution was 
not quite genial. Sons and grandsons of the civil war veterans had 
passionately kept the memory of the fratricidal struggle alive, subsequently 
blending it with their own post-war political experiences. The old dichotomy 
between right and left reappeared with the 1974 transition to democracy, 
dividing Greeks into two broad, subculturally distinct social communities. 
Soon afterwards, it would transform into the clash between the ND and 
PASOK, which presented themselves as unmitigated antagonists and 
intransigent enemies. Sharp ideological bipolarity and acute polarization of 
society remain the main characteristics of Greek politics until this day. The 
relation of moderate conservatives with the extreme right is, in the present 
context, more interesting. In fact, the ND faced serious opposition only 
unilaterally, due to the absence of a politically entrenched, as well as durable, 
political force on the far right of the political competition space, able to 
exercize significant centrifugal pulls. True, the extreme right breakaways who 
formed the National Front (EP) shortly before the 1977 elections became 
capable (until they disappeared soon thereafter) of some "blackmailing", but 
this is a far cry from saying that EP actually succeeded in frustrating the
80 For a concise review of coalition-building in post-war Italy, see David Hine, Governing 
Italy: The Politics of Bargained Pluralism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 96-107.
81 Yet, the MSI anything but merged with the moderate conservatives or otherwise 
disappeared. And what else is it if not an irony of history that, at the end, instead of being 
progressively absorbed by the Christian Democrats, the MSI would in fact outlast them and, 





























































































centripetalism of the moderate conservatives.^ the ND was thus able to push 
a good deal centerward precisely because political competition in Greece was 
predominantly bipolar between two large parties, the ND on the broad right 
and PASOK on the broad left.83
Yet, because the extreme right was neither organizationally coherent (thus 
delimiting the linear distance separating it and the center) nor was it entirely 
absorbed by the ND (thus eliminating its delegitimizing potential), the length 
of space between right and center appeared in Greece quite extended, this 
caused the overstretching of ND in its attempt to cover it. Taking advantage of 
this situation, PASOK, pitting a conflictual logic against ND's consensual one, 
pursued a strategy of polarization with the purpose of reinforcing Greece's 
dominant right-left cleavage.84 Although the ND managed to go a long way 
towards the center in terms of actual policies, it was unable to do so in terms of 
symbolic associations and lay uncontested claims to democratic purity. The 
"center", both in its ideological and physical dimensions, was lost to ND 
because PASOK proved more capable of moving in and imposing itself as the 
authorized and legitimate occupant of that space. The ND, handcuffed to its 
past and incapable of reversing symbolic associations to its favor, failed to 
entirely dissociate itself from its reprobate right-wing past and be perceived as 
a centrist, and hence wholly legitimate, party.
For this view see Seraphim Seferiades, "Polarization and Nonproportionality: The 
Greek Party System in the Postwar Era", Comparative Politics 19:1 (1986), based on the erroneous 
assumption that the party system in Greece is characterized by extreme and polarized pluralism.
83 This thesis has been fully developed by George Th. Mavrogordatos, Rise of the Green Sum 
The Greek Election of 1981 (London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College; 
Occasional Paper no.l, 1983); and, by the same author, "The Greek Party System: A Case of 
'Limited but Polarized Pluralism'?", in Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (eds.), Party Politics in 
Contemporary Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1984).
84 Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Democratic Breakdown 
and Consolidation: The Theoretical Implications of the 'Greek Paradox'", paper presented at the 
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